## Colophon tags:: url:: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC date:: [[]] %% title:: Dating Apps and the Digital Sexual Sphere type:: [[clipped-note]] author:: [[@cambridge.org]] %% ## Notes > However, to understand what is at stake we need a normative political–theoretical framework able to properly capture the harm, as well as the value, that these apps potentially bring about. In this paper, I provide such a framework. Specifically, I bring the tools of analytical political theories of justice to the dating app. I ask what it would mean to realize the demands of liberal egalitarian justice in this context, as these demands apply to the sexual sphere—the sphere of society that encompasses sexual relationships, and of which the digital sexual sphere is a substantial part. I defend the view that dating apps can be justified, provided they exercise their power in line with three distinct interests people have in this sphere. I show that based on these interests are three sexual-sphere-specific claims that individuals have against others: the claim to noninterference, the claim to equal standing, and the claim to choice improvement. — [view in context](https://hyp.is/mRt52uiVEe-zIq9kqxMhHA/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC) > Applying this framework to the digital sexual sphere and specifically to the case of dating apps, I find that these apps can provide immense value to individuals, as they make the realization of the claims of equal standing and choice improvement more likely. However, they do this partially and unequally, and often fail to appropriately balance these claims against the claim to noninterference. I argue that regulation of this part of the digital sexual sphere is prima facie justified and propose novel policy interventions. — [view in context](https://hyp.is/uKa6UuiWEe-uk9OzNtFa7w/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC) > Before we begin, I note that many of the problems of the contemporary digital sexual sphere are caused by dysfunctionalities and inequalities in the wider digital world. The digital political economy prevents people from being in control over their digital and nondigital lives (Fischli Reference Fischli2022b), including over their digital sexual lives (Stardust, Albury, and Kennedy Reference Stardust, Albury and Kennedy2023). Therefore, it is worth underscoring that fully realizing justice in the digital sexual sphere would require the restructuring of the broader political economy of technology.Footnote — [view in context](https://hyp.is/TbwA1OiXEe-DfSNQPf-qoA/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC) > However, in this paper, my purpose is not to provide a full account of what we might call a just “digital basic structure.” Instead, the paper more narrowly considers problems concerning our specific interests in the digital sexual sphere, as they arise in dating apps. Specifically, I focus on the power exercised over users within these apps. — [view in context](https://hyp.is/UtUczOiXEe-VY_OMY2nyPQ/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC) > However, to understand what is at stake we need a normative political–theoretical framework able to properly capture the harm, as well as the value, that these apps potentially bring about. In this paper, I provide such a framework. Specifically, I bring the tools of analytical political theories of justice to the dating app. I ask what it would mean to realize the demands of liberal egalitarian justice in this context, as these demands apply to the sexual sphere—the sphere of society that encompasses sexual relationships, and of which the digital sexual sphere is a substantial part. I defend the view that dating apps can be justified, provided they exercise their power in line with three distinct interests people have in this sphere. I show that based on these interests are three sexual-sphere-specific claims that individuals have against others: the claim to noninterference, the claim to equal standing, and the claim to choice improvement. — [view in context](https://hyp.is/mRt52uiVEe-zIq9kqxMhHA/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC) > Applying this framework to the digital sexual sphere and specifically to the case of dating apps, I find that these apps can provide immense value to individuals, as they make the realization of the claims of equal standing and choice improvement more likely. However, they do this partially and unequally, and often fail to appropriately balance these claims against the claim to noninterference. I argue that regulation of this part of the digital sexual sphere is prima facie justified and propose novel policy interventions. — [view in context](https://hyp.is/uKa6UuiWEe-uk9OzNtFa7w/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC) > Before we begin, I note that many of the problems of the contemporary digital sexual sphere are caused by dysfunctionalities and inequalities in the wider digital world. The digital political economy prevents people from being in control over their digital and nondigital lives (Fischli Reference Fischli2022b), including over their digital sexual lives (Stardust, Albury, and Kennedy Reference Stardust, Albury and Kennedy2023). Therefore, it is worth underscoring that fully realizing justice in the digital sexual sphere would require the restructuring of the broader political economy of technology.Footnote — [view in context](https://hyp.is/TbwA1OiXEe-DfSNQPf-qoA/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC) > However, in this paper, my purpose is not to provide a full account of what we might call a just “digital basic structure.” Instead, the paper more narrowly considers problems concerning our specific interests in the digital sexual sphere, as they arise in dating apps. Specifically, I focus on the power exercised over users within these apps. — [view in context](https://hyp.is/UtUczOiXEe-VY_OMY2nyPQ/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dating-apps-and-the-digital-sexual-sphere/2F83AAEFB7DEA94FA4179369A004CEEC)